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Academic Freedom: A Prologue
Steve Sheppard*
Academic freedom has been a problem for twenty-five
hundred years. How should society protect-or punish-
teachers, students, schools, and researchers? What is the
legal framework that determines who is subject to the
immunities - or the liabilities - that result?
The standard reference to start this story is, of course,
the trial of Socrates, the great philosopher of ancient
Greece. In 399 B.C.E. Socrates was condemned to death
by the jury of Athens for corrupting its young by teaching
them to question the received wisdom of their elders. His
trial and death have been a metaphor to generations of
teachers, though the metaphor may signify various things.'
One reading is that good teaching challenges the
orthodox. An effective teacher will always be hated by
conservative elements in society by requiring the young to
question the assumptions and commitments of the old.
Thus are creative destruction and growth fueled by
education, and so are the animosities of those wedded to
the past incurred.
Another reading is that the function of education is to
identify and preserve orthodoxy. The proper role of the
teacher is to instill in the young a reverence for the values
.Judge William Enfield Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas. I am grateful to the Hartman Hotz Trust for sponsoring the talks of
Robert Post and Fred Schauer, which follow this elementary introduction to their
topics, and to the staff of the Arkansas Law Review for their brilliance in hosting this
event. My greater thanks, however, go to the speakers, Professors Post and Schauer,
whose remarks follow. See Robert Post, Discipline and Freedom in the Academy, 65
ARK. L. REV. 201 (2012); Frederick Schauer, The Permutation of Academic
Freedom, 65 ARK. L. REV. 191 (2012).
1. Journalist Isador Stone examined Socrates' trial in a lively and thoughtful
essay that not only emphasizes the conflict in world view between the modern-
thinking Socrates and the conservative Athenians but also clarifies the ease with
which both sides could have avoided the tragic outcome. See I.F. STONE, THE
TRIALS OF SOCRATES (Little, Brown & Co. ed., 1988).
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of their elders. Thus is society preserved, and so are those
who challenge its core truths to be weeded out and
punished, not only to protect the young but also to warn
other dissidents to stay in line.2
Teachers who think of themselves as modern prefer
the first reading. Their critics prefer the second-at least
most of the time. The shoe can sometimes be on the other
foot.3 The tension between these modern and orthodox
readings persists not only in American education
(particularly in higher education) but also in the legal
assessment of the educational enterprise.
The United States inherited an educational tradition
from Europe. U.S. laws have recurrently but slowly
reflected European approaches to education.
The faculties of medieval colleges were effectively
guilds with their own rules, though the rules were
sometimes set by the teachers, sometimes by the students,
and sometimes altered by the church or the monarchs.'
Teachers of pupils younger than the collegiate were
beholden to their employers, either the church, the patron,
or (eventually) the burghers of the towns that employed
them. At all levels, in a largely illiterate world, teachers
were usually given deference by cultural leaders, in part
2. Thomas Hobbes was a lively critic of academic freedom along these lines,
complaining that the universities were the core of rebellion, leading to the English
Civil war. See THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH, OR THE LONG PARLIAMENT 58
(Ferdinand Tonnes ed.,University of Chicago Press, 1990) (1681); MARK H. CURTIS,
THE ALIENATED INTELLECTUALS OF EARLY STUART ENGLAND, PAST &
PRESENT 25 (1962).
3. See Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Interpretation of Academic Freedom,
in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181 (Louis Menand ed., University of
Chicago Press 1996).
4. On this point, I am grateful to Robert Post's thoughtful division of
educational purposes recognized by the courts among civic education, democratic
education, and critical education. My dichotomy between the modern and orthodox
readings of the trial of Socrates is nicely illuminated by noting the orthodox reading
of the trial fits well with civic education and very uncomfortably with democratic
education; the modern reading of the trial fits easily with critical education and
comfortably but not perfectly with democratic education. See Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329-25
(1991).
5. See Richard Hofstadter, The European Heritage, in RICHARD
HOFSTADTER AND WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Columbia Univ. Press 1955).
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owing to the value placed on their learning, in part owing to
the near mystical relationship between literate knowledge
and religious belief, and in part owing to the agreeability of
the scholarly lifestyle. As long as the college lecturer did
not unduly challenge the authority of the church or the
monarch, the church and the monarch protected the
lecturer from the perils of ordinary disagreements.
This is not to say the occasional collegian did not stray
into trouble with either power. Famously, in 1616, Galileo
taught math and astronomy at the University of Padua and
wrote his Dialogues on the Great Systems.6 This book
earned him a trial before the Inquisition in 1633, which left
him reading psalms under house arrest for the remainder of
his days.' Less well known now are the occasional purges
of Oxford dons for not timely altering their loyalties or
religious inclinations as various monarchs took the English
throne (or were taken from it)." One could, of course, find
trouble from both quarters. By royal command, the name
of John Locke, a tutor at the College of Christ Church,
Oxford, was erased from the list of students at Christ
Church in 1684, and, following a debate with Archbishop
Stillingfleet, in 1701 Locke's great book, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, was nearly banned
from use in Oxford instruction.9
College life in early America echoed the need to
conform to extracurricular political and religious dogma.
Henry Dunster, Harvard's first president, resigned from
6. GALILEO GALILEI, DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE TWO CHIEF WORLD
SYSTEMS, PTOLEMAIC & COPERNICAN (Stillman Drake trans., Albert Einstein
forward, Univ. of Cal. Press 1967).
7. The most satisfying account in English may be MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO,
RETRYING GALILEO (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005). The trial materials are accessible
through ANTONIO FAVARO, GALILEO E L'INOUISIZIONE: DOCUMENTI DEL
PROCESSO GALILEJANO ESISTENTI NELL'ARCHIVIO DEL S. UFFIZIO E
NELL'ARCHIVIO SEGRETO VATICANO (G. Barbare 1907). Of course, Brecht's
examinations of the role of the scientist in society remain the most vivid imaginings
of the trial itself. See BERTOLT BRECHT, GALILEO (Charles Laughton, trans.)
(Grove Press, 1994).
8. See, e.g., SIR JOHN PECHELL,THE HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
OXFORD: FROM THE DEATH OF WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR TO THE DEMISE OF
QUEEN ELIZABETH 218-19 (1773).
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office in part owing to his dispute with the church that
regulated the commonwealth and the college: the church
ordaining that infants shall be baptized, Dunster refused to
baptize his own. 0 Even so, the pragmatic benefits of
religious toleration were widely understood by colonial and
early federal leaders." The same, though, was not true of
political toleration, including both squabbles over loyalty to
crown or colony in the Revolution and-in several
celebrated cases-problems for southern professors who
failed to support slavery or the Democratic Party. Indeed,
no less a personage than Chancellor Frederick Barnard at
Ole Miss was closely investigated for suspicion of
abolitionist views and only kept his position when his
slaveholding sympathies were proved.12
The role of the professor in the United States changed
considerably over the nineteenth century, and the
institutional ideal of academic freedom emerged during this
change. In the early 1800s, the college teacher was seen as
little more than a senior tutor, teaching advanced subjects
but still largely thought to instill the knowledge drawn
either from the scholarship of others or from the wisdom of
the ages. Granted, college lecturers wrote books and
pamphlets, but the role for most was that of an instructor
and not a researcher. By mid-century, that role was
changing. In the depths of the American Civil War, the
federal Morrill Acts established the nationwide system of
state land-grant universities to provide a liberal and
practical education to the working classes, with the
expectation that faculty would develop new ideas and
devices in those fields.13 The controversial and
10. See JEREMIAH CHAPLIN, LIFE OF HENRY DUNSTER: FIRST PRESIDENT OF
HARVARD COLLEGE (James R. Osgood & Co. 1872).
11. See Richard Hofstadter, The Colonial Colleges, in RICHARD HOFSTADTER
AND WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES (Columbia Univ. Press 1955).
12. See Walter Metzger, The Old-Time College, in RICHARD HOFSTADTER
AND WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES 209, 257 (Columbia Univ. Press 1955). Barnard, who was later
president of Columbia College in New York, fell under suspicion for accepting the
testimony of a slave against a student.
13. See Land Grant College (Morrill) Act , Pub. L. No. 37-108, 12 Stat. 503
(1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 301-309 (2006)). The purposes of the
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experimental nature of science and the arts developed
alongside an American culture that was increasingly
industrial, urban, and transient. New doctoral programs
were established in deliberate emulation of English and
German models of research, such as those at Johns
Hopkins University and the Harvard of Charles Elliot.14
The influence of German academics and their model of
research in the United States was particularly significant
because of its acceptance of the Prussian ideal of
lehrfreiheit, the freedom to teach as one chooses, and
lernfreiheit, the freedom to study as one chooses.' This
freedom of the lecture hall was essential to the new ideal of
the university as a training ground for democracy as well as
a source of change, and by the end of the nineteenth
century, the university professor was expected not only to
be an agent of invention but also an agent of social change
and of economic improvement. 6
Despite the more intellectually robust character of the
university researcher, the old model of the teacher
beholden to the college patron was reborn, with
industrialists and politicians supplanting the role once held
by bishops and princes. In 1900, Edward Ross, a young
economist and criminologist at Stanford University, was
fired from his position there, largely because university
trustee Jane Stanford disagreed with his racist views of
Chinese laborers.17 Despite (or because of) the progressive
colleges to be created were far broader than mere instruction. See SOY F. CROSS,
JUSTIN SMITH MORRILL: FATHER OF THE LAND-GRANT COLLEGES 77 (Michigan
State Univ. Press 1998).
14. See, e.g., FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY (Univ. of Ga. Press 1990).
15. See KARL JASPERS, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY (Peter Owen ed.,
1960). The first legal recognition of lehrfreiheit was Article 20 of the 1850
Constitution of Prussia, "Knowledge and its teaching shall be free." See Walter
Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in
America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (1988).
16. See LAURENCE R. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY (Univ. of Chi. Press 1970).
17. Jane Stanford was not only a trustee; she was the widow of Governor
Leland Stanford and the university's co-founder. The dispute between the trustees,
led by Mrs. Stanford, and Prof. Ross, whose views were much more socially
acceptable at the time than might appear today, is nicely chronicled in ORRIN L.
181
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ideology of the university position and the racist views of
the professor, other professors were incensed at the
treatment of their peer. Six resigned, and fifteen years later
the incident was sufficiently memorable to spur Arthur 0.
Lovejoy and John Dewey to organize the Association of
American University Professors ("AAUP"), which was to
develop and protect a standard of academic freedom for its
members and their peers.'8 The immediate spur to that
project, however, was the drumbeat of similar firings. In
1913, LaFayette College fired John Mecklin for the clash
between his liberal views and the college president's
Presbyterian conservatism.19 In 1915, the University of
Pennsylvania fired Scott Nearing, an economics professor
whose public speeches against child labor were challenged
as political activism.20 Thus, the new AAUP confronted
issues of academic freedom for professors speaking not just
in their classes and writings but beyond the campus walls.
The result was a statement of principles, issued in 1915,
which became the basis for the professional understanding
of academic freedom in the United States.21
A pivotal moment in American academic freedom
arose not from the urban college classrooms of Stanford
and Penn but from a high school in rural Dayton,
Tennessee, where football coach and science teacher John
T. Scopes was arrested, not just fired, in 1925 for teaching
evolution in violation of state law. Though the charges
originated in a collusion between the school superintendent
and the defendant to gain publicity for the town, the trial
ELLIOTT, STANFORD UNIVERSITY: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 251 (Stanford
Univ. Press 1937).
18. AAUP, History of the AA UP, http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/history/
(last visited Mar. 11, 2012); Walter P. Metzger, Origins of the Association, 51 AAUP
BULL. 229 (1965).
19. See JOHN M. MECKLIN, MY QUEST FOR FREEDOM (Scribners 1945).
20. See Robert J. Margesson, A Rhetorical History of Academic Freedom
from 1900 to 2006 69 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver
Faculty of Social Sciences). Nearing lived a long life and later gained fame as a
leader of an intellectual movement rejecting urban life. See JOHN A. SALTMARSH,
Scon NEARING: AN INTELLEcTUAL BIOGRAPHY (Temple Univ. Press 1991).
21. See Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure, 1 AAUP Bull. 17 (1915), available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres




attracted famous lawyers and global attention to the
arguments for and against the need to teach science
according to its own discipline rather than religious or
political preferences. Scopes was convicted, but the idea
that the discipline must be taught by its standards rather
than legislative whim gained a firm hold in the national
consciousness. 22
Twentieth-century American universities, however,
were as influenced by world events as by the local reflection
of those events in society. The perils of war and national
upheaval had profound and sometimes conflicting effects in
the United States. On the one hand, the more tolerant and
protective environments of American universities
contrasted well to the anti-Semitism and nationalist
persecutions of academics in Germany and Russia, which
led teachers like Albert Einstein to the United States.23
Some of the principles underlying this environment were
integrated with the 1915 principles, which were reduced to
a code in 1940 by the AAUP and the Association of
American Colleges, ensuring freedom in research and
teaching.24 Yet the tide seemed all too often to flow against
22. The conviction was later overturned on the technical grounds that the
judge rather than the jury determined the penalty. See JEFFREY P. MORAN, THE
SCOPES TRIAL: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (St. Martin's Press 2002);
EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND
AMERICA'S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (Basic Books
2006).
23. It must be hastily noted, though, that despite opportunities at the New
School for Social Research and other universities, quotas for Jewish students, latent
anti-Semitism, and academic tribalism limited Jewish success in the American
academy until well past the second world war. See Edward S. Shapiro, The Friendly
University: Jews in Academia since World War II, 46 JUDAISM 365 (1997).
24. The principles of academic freedom protected by academic tenure,
established in 1940 between the AAUP and what is now the Association of
American Universities and Colleges, provides:
1) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the
publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their
other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be
based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.
2) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their
subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject. Limitations
of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the
183
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such toleration, as faculty snobbery and bigotry abetted
governmental purges of anarchists, syndicalists, unionists,
and communists.25 The AAUP continues to be the
champion of academic freedom in the United States, and its
Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure hears claims
that institutions of higher learning have violated its
principles. These claims are investigated by the AAUP
staff and committee, which censures universities who
violate AAUP principles.26
Academic freedom exists in the law as well as in
professional guidelines. As an initial matter, twentieth-
century courts did not welcome the notion that academics
have a privilege greater than others to challenge the public
consensus of prevailing morality.27 Yet as the scope of the
institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the
appointment.
3) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned
profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak
or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or
discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special
obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should
remember that the public may judge their profession and their
institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for
the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that
they are not speaking for the institution.
AAUP, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, http://www.
aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm (last visited Mar.
11, 2012).
25. One of the more profound demands resulting from such tension during
the world wars and the Cold War was the evolution of loyalty tests and oaths
required of faculty members. See, e.g., GEORGE R. STEWARD, THE YEAR OF THE
OATH: THE FIGHT FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA (Doubleday 1950). The oath requirement is still enforced in some
states. See, e.g., California Const. art. XX, § 3. In 2008, a Quaker professor at the
California State University at Fullerton was fired, though she was reinstated when a
modification of the oath was made available to her. See, e.g., Nanette Asimov,
Quaker Teacher Fired for Changing Loyalty Oath, SFGATE (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/02/29/BAQPVAUVO.DTL.
26. The censure and sanction process is described at AAUP, Censure List,
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/censuredadmins/default.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2012).
27. In 1940, the courts of New York judicially barred the appointment of
Bertrand Russell, then one of the leading thinkers in the English speaking world, as
a professor at City College of New York because he lacked the requisite character
and fitness. Kay v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of N.Y., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 20
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First Amendment widened, it encompassed free speech in
the academy, and academic freedom acquired a
constitutional dimension distinct from its professional
contours.
The first federal recognition of academic freedom
addressed the rights of high school teachers.' In 1952,
Justice William 0. Douglass dissented from a decision
upholding a New York law regulating teacher speech,
noting: "The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought
and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled
to it; and none needs it more than the teacher."2 9 That
same year, the Court moved toward a form of academic
freedom when it struck down an Oklahoma statute banning
teachers and other civil servants who would not subscribe
to a loyalty oath, finding that its failure to give sufficient
notice of a liability in belonging to a proscribed
organization violated the teachers' rights to due process of
law.3 0 Concurring in that case, Justice Frankfurter made
clear its implications for protecting a freedom of inquiry for
teachers,3 1  a point Justice Douglas later made in the
majority opinion in Griswold.32
N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 29 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1940). Among
Russell's works that Justice McGeehan found proved his unfitness to teach were
Russell's views that "all sex relations which do not involve children should be
regarded as a purely private affair, and that if a man and a woman choose to live
together without having children, that should be no one's business but their own."
Id. at 827. The academic reaction to this result was fierce but not terribly significant.
See The Bertrand Russell Case: The History of a Litigation, 53 HARVARD L. REV.
1192 (1940); THE BERTRAND RUSSELL CASE (John Dewey and Horace M. Kallen
eds., Viking 1941). Though perhaps it added interest at the time, much of the
criticism of the court's ruling is blunted for the modern reader by sexist criticism of
the plaintiff in Russell's case. See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton, Trial by Ordeal, New
Style, 50 YALE L.J. 778 (1941).
28. Some state recognition of academic freedom preceded its federal
development. One example is the refusal by the Nebraska courts to allow a state
law requiring courses to be taught in English to apply to a private school, a decision
not based on the freedoms of the teachers or their students but on the interest of
parents and school owners, based as much on property rights and equal protection
as on a claim or free expression. See Neb. Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod of
Mo., Ohio, & other States v. McKelvie, 175 N.W. 531, 535 (1919).
29. Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
30. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
31. Frankfurter echoed Douglas's opinion earlier that year when he wrote:
185
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The idea that academic freedom is an aspect of the
constitutional freedom of speech gained adherence in a
majority opinion of the Court in 1957, when a state
legislature's investigation of a college lecturer's loyalty was
found to violate due process because, as Chief Justice
Warren said, "Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere
of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die."33  That idea was more
clearly enunciated a decade later by Justice Douglas: "Our
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom."3
Thus the courts have recognized constitutional
dimensions to academic freedom, arising mainly from the
First Amendment but potentially from the due process
clauses and other doctrines. One critical aspect of the
evolution of this freedom is that it evolved along with the
constitutional rights of students, albeit not under the
designation of academic freedom, which has been
increasingly used only to describe such rights for professors
or teachers and universities or institutions. 35  This broad,
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary
grades to the university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore
not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster
those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make
for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and
effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept
and practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be
exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out
their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and
critical mind are denied to them.
Wieman, 344 U.S. at 196 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
33. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250 (1957).
34. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
35. First Amendment protections of student rights were recognized first as




constitutionalized freedom thus applies to professors,
teachers, students, schools, and colleges, in dimensions like
most constitutional rights, which have limits that vary
according to context and claimant.36
Comparing the growth of institutional academic
freedom and constitutional academic freedom, it is clear
that academic freedom has varied sources, applied to
various people and institutions in various academic roles.
What is the role of academic freedom when the freedom of
speech does not apply to the academic? It can be hard to
determine the scope of a constitutional right to free speech
in the domain of academic speech, which can be both
broader and narrower than other forms of constitutionally
protected speech. Perhaps unbelievably, the Supreme
Court has recently held that speech might not receive
protection for state-employed faculty members, when the
speech is in the scope of the faculty members' official
duties.37 Yet it is still possible for speech to enjoy
protection when it is protected speech used in an
unprotected aspect of employment.3 8 Such complications
arise frequently owing to the controversies in which
academics find themselves.
Some of these controversies are the fruit of public or
political dislike of the professor's basic research, such as the
recent persecution of climate scientists by those who dislike
W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist.,
393 US 503 (1969). The unfortunate punishment of students for having their own
ideas may be older than the punishment of teachers for having theirs. Though
ancient texts are scant on the truth of the claim, Hippasus, a student of Pythagoras
(and a scholar in his own right), is said to have been drowned by fellow students for
discovering irrational numbers and so contradicting his teacher's canon, though he
may have been punished for disclosing the secrets of their group. See DAVID
BERLINSKI, INFINITE ASCENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 9-10 (2005),
contra THOMAS STANLEY, PYTHAGORAS: His LIFE AND TEACHINGS 129 (Ibis
2010); IAMBLICHUS, THE LIFE OF PYTHAGORAS (Kenneth Sylvan Guthreie trans.,
Platonist Press 1919). Pythagoras lived a century before Socrates.
36. Among the studies of the constitutional dimension of academic freedom,
see, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO COLLEGE: FIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
(NYU Press 2011).
37. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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the implications of their conclusions.39 Some controversies
are rooted in political responses to professors who
comment in public on matters of moment, attracting
hostility for statements arising from their professional
research or their personal politics and merely their beliefs.40
Some controversies are institutional, arising from donors,
trustees, administrators, students, or colleagues, who
oppose faculty members whose commentary on political
issues offends them.41 Some arise from the statements or
actions of faculty members outside of the university setting,
before their appointments or while on leave from them.42
To speak of academic freedom as a single concept might
seem nearly impossible.
Following this prologue are two discussions of
academic freedom that are important to understanding its
significance and application in the United States. In these
2011 Hartman Hotz addresses at the University of
Arkansas, Frederick Schauer first organizes the distinct and
conflicting meanings of academic freedom as a topic of
expression,43 properly focusing on the manner in which
academic freedom affects various actors in the academy."
He situates the government, the institution, the teacher,
and the student in specific relationships to one another, and
considers the role each has as an aspect of their freedom in
performing that role. This taxonomy of academic freedom
is essential to focusing the questions that arise from it. As a
logical matter, without this sort of organization, there is no
39. See MICHAEL E. MANN, THE HOCKEY STICK AND THE CLIMATE WARS:
DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES (Columbia Univ. Press 2012).
40. On the use of public-records requests to harass faculty commenting on
labor and political matters, see Howard Schweber & Donald A. Downs, Stop
Poisonous Record Requests, WIS. STATE JOURNAL, http://host.madison.com/wsj/
news/opinion/column/article_891c738a-5c00-1 1e0-8177-001cc4c03286.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
41. See, e.g., Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 2010 WL 5099682 (Colo.
App. Nov. 24,2010); Adams, 460 F.3d 550.
42. Lawrence Rosenthal, Those Who Can't, Teach: What the Legal Career of
John Yoo Tells Us about Who Should Be Teaching Law, 80 MIss. L.J. 1563 (2011).
43. See Frederick Schauer, The Permutation of Academic Freedom, 65 ARK. L.
REV. 191 (2012).
44. Schauer's analysis of academic freedom is derived in part and extended
from his often-quoted article, Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic




way to distinguish the academic freedom of the professor
from the academic freedom of the university or the student.
As a practical matter, without Schauer's organization and
the differentiation of roles that it embraces, no meaningful
academic freedom is likely: there is no reason to provide a
greater degree of protection to the professor than to others.
Robert Post then provides an important theoretical
evaluation of academic freedom as both a professional
value and as a distinct constitutional value.45  He argues
that academic freedom, beyond the mere protections of
speech from government interference, is essential to
democracy, as long as it is justified by and limited to the
justification of expertise. Expertise as understood by the
community of experts in a given field of scholarship-like
chemistry, ethics, or climate science-is a powerful tool for
sorting meaningful from spurious claims of academic
freedom.46  His concept of expertise according to the
principles of a discipline as the defining criterion of
academic freedom is both useful and subtle, and it bears
considerable weight in sorting out claims that deserve
special protection in the academy from those that do not.47
Post's idea that the standards of specific disciplines are
the source of academic freedom resonates with a broader
idea that a failure to recognize the role played by expertise
may weaken democracy in many different ways. This
broader argument, heightened by the recent popularity of
the antithetical notion that knowledge is better found
among the masses than in the labs,48 seeks to protect the
benefits of complicated and evaluated data that can be
refined by experts and applied in the assessment of
knowledge. This is particularly important to the creation of
45. See Robert Post, Discipline and Freedom in the Academy, 65 ARK. L. REV.
201 (2012).
46. Here, Post summarizes and applies an argument developed in ROBERT
POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (Yale Univ. Press 2012).
47. In many ways, Post answers questions raised by Larry Alexander in his
essay, Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883 (2006).
Alexander suggests that politicized and post-modern arguments of a particularly
empty form do not deserve the protections of academic freedom. Id.
48. See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (Anchor 2005).
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policy and law, because the narrative of experts is so easily
lost among the smug assertions of the crowd.49  Though
Post's argument is at a tangent to this counter-egalitarian
line of inquiry, it nicely compliments it.
That is not to say that Post's argument is a creature of
the moment. Indeed, it has a distinguished lineage and
echoes one of the earliest of all academic claims to
freedom - Socrates' own.
Meletus, the chief accuser of Socrates, argued that
Socrates' influence with his students was greater than their
parents. Socrates admitted the charge but argued it should
not be the basis of an offense, because his expertise as an
educator was greater than that of the parents:
"I admit it," Socrates replied, "at least where
education is concerned. You see people know this is a
special concern of mine. And when it comes to health
people trust doctors rather than their parents. And in
the meetings of the assembly, I'm sure that all the
Athenians trust the ones who speak with the most
intelligence rather than their own relations. And then,
of course, don't you choose as generals, in preference
to your fathers and your brothers - and even, by Zeus,
your own selves - whomever you regard as having the
best judgment about warfare?
"That's right, Socrates," replied Meletus,
"because it makes good sense as well as being the
established custom."
"Well then," Socrates replied, "don't you think it
amazing that whereas the best practitioners in other
areas of expertise are not only given an appropriate
reward but are also highly esteemed, I myself who am
considered by some to be the best judge about the
greatest good for men-I mean education-that I am,
for this very reason, indicted by you on a capital
charge?""
49. For a more general argument along these lines, see FRANK FISCHER,
DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISE: REORIENTING POLICY INQUIRY (Oxford Univ.
Press 2009).
50. Xenophon, Socrates' Defense to the Jury, in THE TRIALS OF SOCRATES:
SIX CLASSIC TEXTS 178, 182-83 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ'g 2002).
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Expertise is the reason teachers are assigned the roles
they hold. (Or, at least it should be). The protections of
academic -freedom ought to apply to the use of that
expertise, and in doing so, that freedom deservedly extends
beyond the usual boundaries of freedom in expression,
whether it is assured by a constitution or by contract. It is
nice to agree with Socrates, and with Professor Post, in such
a powerful argument.
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